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Targeted Economic Development: Its Role in Maine 
Economic Policy 
 
Maine Policy Review (1996).  Volume 5, Number 3 
 
Targeted economic development strategies challenge traditional approaches to economic 
development by making explicit the recipients of job growth and job creation. They link 
economic development concerns such as business growth and a positive business climate to 
often-ignored social criteria that are reflected in the question of who wins and who loses in our 
present economy. 
Dickstein brings a practitioner’s perspective to this issue by relating Coastal Enterprises Inc.’s 
experience in using gap financing programs to link people with low incomes to jobs created 
through business start-ups or expansions. 
 by Carla Dickstein 
Introduction 
Despite the magnitude and growth of economic disparities in Maine, equity concerns have been a 
poor stepchild in most economic development policies that focus on general business 
development and improving the economic infrastructure and business climate.1 
Slowly, the economic development policy debate is shifting toward equity concerns. Some of the 
benchmarks recently established by the Maine Economic Growth Council reflect equity goals to 
reduce regional and income disparities.2 There also have been recent legislative efforts to tie 
economic development dollars to social paybacks.3 Finally, welfare reform and the current 
emphasis on welfare-to-work is forcing a dialogue about where welfare recipients will find work. 
Perhaps the biggest opportunity for influencing public policy is the recent attention of the 
mainstream press to the changing economic order and its widespread impacts. Increasing 
polarization of income, the rise in contingent labor, corporate downsizing, huge disparities in 
compensation between chief executive officers and workers, and even the sweatshops that 
produce celebrity-label clothing have been known for years. But now these economic and social 
justice issues are surfacing as part of the public’s world view and can be raised in public 
discourse. Again it is legitimate to ask these questions: Who wins and loses in the present 
economy? What is the role of economic development in altering that equation? And, how can 
economic development dollars have the greatest social impact? 
This article examines the role of targeted economic development strategies in accomplishing 
explicit equity goals. It argues that traditional economic development programs that support 
business development and economic growth are insufficient to create quality jobs, especially for 
people on public assistance. Targeted strategies are needed to link these people directly to 
employment opportunities. The article draws on lessons learned from current practices at Coastal 
Enterprises Inc., a community development corporation based in Wiscasset with a nearly 20-year 
history of working with Maine businesses and communities. 
Limitations of Traditional Economic Development Programs 
To date, the dominant focus of economic development policy and practice has been on creating a 
conducive environment for businesses to grow and prosper (Blair, 1995). The assumption has 
been that the benefits of this growth would trickle down to all segments of society through more 
jobs, lower unemployment, higher wages, and an increased tax base. Government intervention 
would come primarily through investments in physical infrastructure, education and training; a 
favorable regulatory and tax environment; and direct business assistance programs. 
However, the extent to which benefits do trickle down, particularly to the poor, is increasingly in 
question. (See Seguino, 1995 for a review of the literature). The income inequality that received 
so much attention during the past six months in the Maine Sunday Telegram and Portland Press 
Herald began to widen during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1979, the top 20 percent of Maine 
households earned, on average, eight times as much as the bottom 20 percent. By 1994, they 
were earning 10 times as much. Between 1979 and 1994, the top one-fifth of Maine households 
gained an average of $12 for every $1 earned by the bottom one-fifth. (Blom and Garber, 1996). 
Although the poor did not fare much better during the high-growth periods of the 1950s and 
1960s, at least labor shared in business prosperity during that period and the social contract was 
alive and well for workers and their families. That is not the case today. Real wages have fallen 
for most workers.4 
Today, jobs in Maine that pay a livable wage are in short supply. The Department of Labor’s 
1996 "Job Gap" study found that only 27 percent of the net job openings filled in 1993 and 1994 
paid a livable wage of at least $11.55 per hour, and that there were 10 job seekers for every 
livable-wage job.5 Of these livable-wage jobs, 63 percent required more than two years of 
training or experience. 
Explanations for the income gap and wage deterioration relate, in part, to structural changes in 
the economy, such as the increasing substitution of technology for labor in both manufacturing 
and service sectors; the trend towards part-time, contingent labor rather than full-time 
employees; the decline of unions; and rising company profits demanded by very competitive 
financial markets.6 These structural changes create even greater barriers for moving welfare 
recipients, especially women, into the workforce at jobs that pay livable wages (Seguino, 1996). 
Efforts to move welfare recipients into the workforce have focused on education and training 
programs, as well as various subsidies to employers. Unfortunately, a focus on improving skills 
through education, training, and job coaching does not necessarily give the poor access to good 
jobs. Employers turn to established networks for recruiting workers. Poor people do not have the 
skills and know-how to work those networks. 
In addition, various demand-side interventions such as tax credits, on-the-job training subsidies, 
and direct cash payments to employers have not been successful in enticing employers to hire 
welfare recipients, especially in a depressed economy. Evaluations of these types of subsidies 
have concluded that they often go unused. Most employers who do use them fill unskilled, low-
wage, and limited-benefit jobs. Furthermore, employers would have hired most of the workers 
filling these positions without the subsidies.7 In some cases, an employer subsidy actually may 
work as a hiring disincentive if firms believe welfare recipients inherently are less productive.8 
The Role of Targeted Development 
The primary purpose of targeted development models, as defined here, is to reduce poverty by 
linking people with low incomes and on public assistance to good jobs. Such programs also may 
target workers displaced by layoffs or defense downsizing to prevent their becoming 
impoverished. Giloth (1995) describes the process as the combination of "employment training, 
human services, and enterprise development to enhance access to and creation of jobs, careers, 
and self-sufficiency for the disadvantaged." 
If targeted interventions are to succeed, they must go beyond incentives and proactively link 
people with jobs. The more depressed the economy, the more leverage is needed on employers to 
access quality jobs. Community-based organizations are among the most successful 
organizations in making these linkages (Harrison, 1994). Instead of trying to bring development 
to distressed communities, these organizations broker jobs already in the region to the people in 
need. 
For example, in Kansas City, Missouri, a unique coalition of corporate, charitable, labor, and 
neighborhood members called the Local Investment Commission has gained national recognition 
by performing this broker role. The commission uses welfare and food stamp payments as a 
wage supplement (equal to $3.05 per hour) to encourage employers to hire welfare recipients for 
permanent jobs that offer regular pay increases and bonuses. Federal and state agencies provide 
Medicaid benefits, child care, and other support to welfare recipients for as many as four years. 
Unlike other wage-subsidy programs, the commission uses the influence of its volunteer 
Business and Economic Committee to find willing employers. 
Gap financing programs are an underused leverage point to link low-income people to jobs 
created through business start-ups or expansions. Gap financing programs have become 
important to companies that cannot access conventional sources of bank financing. In Maine, 
more than $130 million is available annually in small-business loan guarantees and direct loans 
(Roundy, Forthcoming). Such financing programs can be designed to link welfare recipients and 
other low-income people to suitable job openings created in the businesses that are financed. 
In practice, however, few economic development programs in Maine and throughout the nation 
target financing in ways that encourage employers to hire people with low incomes and on public 
assistance. The added goal of linking job creation to targeted populations is considered complex 
and possibly a deterrent to business development and the business climate (Bartik, 1993). 
Another critique is that targeting job creation to the disadvantaged will displace other qualified 
people who, in turn, become disadvantaged. The counter- argument has been that workers with a 
long-term employment history have developed the necessary skills to find other jobs or to create 
their own. Although to my knowledge no research has been done to document displacement 
effects, it is unlikely targeted strategies are a zero-sum game resulting in high displacement of 
the existing workforce.9 
CEI's Approach to Targeted Development 
Coastal Enterprise Inc.’s (CEI) experience with targeted development programs and evaluation 
dates to 1984.10 CEI’s mission as a community development corporation is to help people and 
communities, especially those with low incomes, reach equitable standards of living, working, 
and learning. Creating jobs through small-business financing and counseling has been CEI’s 
primary vehicle for assisting people and communities in need. In recent years, CEI also has 
engaged in affordable housing, social services, and facility development. 
CEI targets its financing programs to assist firms that fulfill specific targeted development goals. 
It does this by screening the larger small businesses--those having more than four people, and 
with loans or investments of more than $25,000--for their economic viability and for the number 
of quality jobs accessible to people with low incomes and on Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children. It then acts as a broker to link those jobs to people in the welfare and employment-
training systems. The process includes targeting promising firms and sectors with quality jobs 
(Dickstein, 1996) and linking jobs to firms through an Employment and Training Agreement as 
part of the financing agreement. 
Coastal Enterprises, Inc. profile 
CEI presently manages $25 million in funds that provide subordinated debt and equity to a 
variety of Maine small businesses that cannot access conventional financing. Just recently it 
launched Maine’s first social investment fund, Coastal Ventures Limited Partnership, to provide 
small-scale equity capital primarily to Maine firms. This fund, initially capitalized at $3.3 
million, is expected to grow to between $5 and $7 million. In addition to financing, CEI operates 
a Small Business Assistance Center that houses a subcenter of the state’s Small Business 
Development Center system. 
The Employment and Training Agreement 
CEI has developed an Employment and Training Agreement to give welfare recipients and 
others with low incomes access to jobs created in companies it finances. While making a loan or 
investment, CEI conducts an employment assessment to screen whether the company will create 
quality jobs suitable for people on public assistance or with low incomes. At a minimum, these 
jobs should pay $6.50 to $8 per hour and offer health benefits and opportunities for skill 
development and mobility. (A study of companies in CEI’s loan portfolio shows the average 
wage is $9.30 per hour, well above that point (LaPlante, 1996).) 
The agreement creates an employment plan in conjunction with the company’s business plan. It 
is a legal commitment companies sign at the time of loan closing, but in reality it works 
primarily through the mutual interests and good faith of both parties. 
When job openings arise, CEI notifies potential candidates from the welfare and training systems 
and brokers available training and apprenticeship resources. Most important, CEI works with the 
welfare and employment-training systems to screen quality applicants for their aptitude and 
interest in the job, thus saving businesses recruiting costs. Businesses also can test workers 
through on-site training periods. Contrary to the stereotype of public assistance recipients, they 
are not by definition more costly to employ than other workers. Many are highly motivated to 
succeed on the job. Even those with the greatest personal barriers to employment have 
succeeded. Unlike other workers, they have external support services already in place to help 
them cope with economic or family crises that arise.11 Several firms have found workers on 
public assistance better prepared than their current labor force. 
Since 1984, CEI has implemented more than 125 Employment and Training Agreements and can 
document successful placements of at least 1,539 low-income people (defined by federal poverty 
guidelines used by the Department of Health and Human Services) in jobs with Maine small 
businesses. Among these companies are Intelligent Controls in Saco, New England Audio 
Resources in Auburn, and CV Finer Foods in Winthrop. The agreements with many of CEI’s 
higher-technology companies require training partners at technical colleges and secondary 
vocational educational schools that have candidates with higher-level skills than those who come 
through the state’s shorter-term welfare-to-work training programs. 
In summary, CEI has found that gap financing, especially if combined with training resources, 
can be a powerful tool to link welfare recipients and others with low income to better-quality 
jobs. The financing brings CEI into a relationship with the firms, while the Employment and 
Training Agreement is a mechanism for exacting social paybacks and greater public 
accountability in exchange for access to high-risk financing. Firms also benefit from the services 
provided through the agreement independent of gap financing. Businesses often exceed targets 
for hiring low-income workers. Six firms have continued to work with CEI after their loans were 
paid off and the agreement was no longer in effect. 
The Employment and Training Agreement in practice: the example of Soleras 
Soleras Inc., an environmentally responsible precision metal manufacturing company in 
Biddeford, is an outstanding example of a successful Employment and Training Agreement. 
During the seventeen months from October 1993 through February 1995, Soleras filled twenty-
three jobs with low-income people, including twelve Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) recipients. Twenty-one still are employed, while one quit and one was fired. Starting 
wages ranged from $6.50 to $8 an hour depending on experience, with an average starting 
hourly wage of $7.24. Most new employees received wage increases within the first three months 
of employment. Current hourly wages range from $7.65 to $14.15, with an average of $9.71. All 
employees are eligible for medical and dental insurance, paid holidays, vacation, life insurance, 
the company pension plan, and full tuition for education courses. These benefits are critical to 
ensure that welfare recipients can complete the transition from the welfare rolls. 
The Soleras employees had higher education, more children, and longer histories receiving 
AFDC than average in Maine. Only 50 percent were women, compared to 96 percent in the 
state’s AFDC program. Conventional indicators of a successful transition to work, such as 
education or previous work experience, were not always accurate predictors of employee 
performance. One of the star participants was a young woman who had received AFDC benefits 
for eight years. Another man with an unkempt appearance and a revoked driver’s license 
surprised his managers with his motivation and loyalty and was able to reinstate his license. 
In interviews conducted in 1995 with Soleras’ new employees, all reported their financial 
situations were improving as a result of having full-time employment (Rutstein, 1995). Many still 
faced large debts and struggled to become financially independent. Transitional support services 
from the state were critical for them. The transition to work had a positive impact on most 
employees’ personal lives and on their families. Even though they spent less time with their 
families, the trade-off was worthwhile. Some even thought the quality of time together improved. 
They felt better about themselves and were more patient with their children. 
The Employment and Training Agreement made a difference in Soleras’ willingness to hire 
people on AFDC. Although Soleras had a strong culture supporting human resource 
development, the management initially was concerned about the quality of referrals coming 
through the project. CEI staff worked hard to screen good applicants and bring the training 
resources needed by employees to do a good job. The on-site training program provided 
participants with basic machining skills and allowed Soleras management to screen prospective 
employees. As the working relationships became more comfortable, Soleras made direct contact 
with the job-training agencies and institutionalized hiring low-income people as part of the 
normal course of doing business. 
Welfare-to-Work Demonstration Projects 
CEI’s Employment and Training Agreement has become a model for the design of the Job 
Opportunities for Low Income Individuals Program administered by the Office of Community 
Services at the federal Department of Health and Human Services. CEI has won four grants 
through this program to provide direct training support to AFDC recipients and place them either 
in jobs CEI’s businesses create or in self-employment opportunities. These projects are 
collaborative efforts among economic development, education, and job-training organizations to 
provide customized skill training, workforce literacy training, peer support, entrepreneurial 
training, business assistance and mentoring, child care, and other services. Two of these projects 
have been completed, and evaluations by the Margaret Chase Smith Center for Public Policy 
showed that the strategy to create unsubsidized employment through placement in businesses 
was successful (Margaret Chase Smith Center, 1995). In the project, Structured Opportunities for 
AFDC Recipients, average starting wages in firms with an Employment and Training Agreement 
were $6.71 an hour, compared to $5.96 an hour for non- participating firms. The vast majority of 
participants placed in companies with agreements received raises, with their average hourly 
wage rising to $7.58. A 1996 follow-up survey of project participants revealed that twenty-seven 
of the thirty-six respondents employed in companies had health benefits. In a similar project, 
Jobs for Unemployed Maine Parents, the average hourly wage was $8.08 for CEI companies 
versus $7.10 for non-CEI companies at the end of the project. Twenty-four of the thirty-nine 
project participants placed in companies had health benefits.  These wages and health benefits 
compare favorably to those achieved by AFDC recipients and participants in the Department of 
Human Services’ ASPIRE program, Maine’s employment education and training program for 
AFDC recipients. The average hourly wage of Maine AFDC recipients surveyed in 1995 was 
$5.37; only 13.1 percent were covered by employer-provided health insurance (Seguino, 1995 
and 1995a). Graduates of the ASPIRE program between July 1995 and January 1996 earned an 
average wage of only $6 per hour in full-time work and $5.23 for part-time work. Only 24 
percent of full-time workers and 4 percent of part-time workers had health insurance (ASPIRE-
JOBS Full Time and Part Time Employment, 1996, cited in Hastedt, Forthcoming). 
More importantly, are these workers earning livable wages? Seguino (1995a) estimated that an 
average hourly wage of $11.55 is needed to meet a basic needs budget.12 However, Seguino’s 
estimates are based on employees covering their own health care costs. The livable wage would 
be less if the employer provided health care. A recent study of companies in CEI’s loan portfolio 
(La Plante, 1996) found that more than 80 percent of CEI-financed companies provided health 
insurance for full-time workers. More, longer-term data are needed but are not currently 
available on wage progression and benefits for participants to determine wage adequacy. Finally, 
one of the intangible outcomes of these projects is the increased self-confidence and self-esteem 
among participants that enabled them to seek training and work (Hurrell, 1996; Margaret Chase 
Smith Center, 1996). 
Welfare-to work demonstration project 
Project SOAR (Structured Opportunities for AFDC Recipients) 1991-1994--targeted to 
Androscoggin County, employed forty-three of seventy AFDC participants in jobs CEI brokered, 
and placed another nine in self-employment opportunities. At the end of the project, fifty-two 
participants were off AFDC, thirty-five were in non-traditional occupations and five were in 
registered apprenticeships. 
Project JUMP (Jobs for Unemployed Maine Parents) 1992-1995--targeted to York County, 
employed thirty-nine of seventy-three AFDC/low-income JOBS (Job Opportunities and Basic 
Skills Training) participants and helped another fourteen become self-employed. At the end of 
the project, fifty participants were off AFDC and five were in non-traditional occupations. 
Project Pioneer 1994-1997--targets job placements from a planned expansion of Pioneer 
Plastics Corporation in Auburn. The program officer worked on site at Pioneer with the human 
resources manager to provide customized adult education courses and non-traditional 
occupational training and skills-training programs. The project also explored the feasibility of a 
multi-employer-supported child care center and transportation services for second- and third-
shift project participants and other employees of Pioneer. So far, the project has employed 
thirty-four of sixty-six AFDC/low-income participants at Pioneer and other businesses; fifteen 
were off AFDC and twenty-six were off food stamps. 
Project POWER (Promotion of Welfare Employment Resources) 1995-1998--assists a for-profit 
company, Employment Trust Inc., essentially by acting as an employee leasing company to 
integrate ninety-two participants from York and Cumberland counties into the workplace, 
support them through the transition off federal assistance, and move them on to the business’ 
payroll and into jobs that lead to economic self-sufficiency. In the first year, POWER has 
employed nine of thirty-one AFDC/low-income participants full time, and three part time. 
Changes in Business Behavior 
CEI’s targeted development programs have had a direct impact on changing business attitudes 
and behavior towards hiring low-income people and welfare recipients. The welfare-to-work 
programs, as well as interviews with other CEI companies, reflect a common experience: people 
on public assistance or with low incomes are excellent employees if properly trained and 
provided the necessary support services, such as transportation and child care (Brennick, 1995). 
Attitudinal data from CEI’s recent social and economic impact study of its loan and investment 
portfolio provide further support that CEI played an "important" or "very important" role in more 
than 80 percent of the firms that had made "some" or "significant" progress toward hiring low-
income people (69 percent of respondents) since receiving CEI financing (LaPlante, 1996). 
Costs Compared to Benefits 
Despite the benefits of these programs, the question invariably arises of whether they are 
sustainable in the long term. Do the benefits outweigh the costs? Cost-benefit studies of CEI’s 
demonstration and targeting programs have not been done. Costs need to be compared to long-
term program benefits, such as the quality of jobs and wage adequacy over time, the degree of 
self-sufficiency and reduction of transfer payments, and the innumerable tangible and intangible 
benefits to individuals and their families. The savings for one person who transitions off public 
assistance (not including administrative costs for welfare programs) is estimated at 
approximately $8,500 per year depending upon child care and Medicaid costs. 
Compared to earlier national evaluations of welfare-to-work programs, CEI’s programs fall into 
a category of programs that provide intensive educational, training, and job development services 
(Gueron and Pauly, 1991). These programs generally have been shown to be most effective in 
getting selected participants into higher- paying jobs but have been less effective in reducing 
welfare expenditures per dollar invested (Ibid.). 
CEI’s unique approach to linking welfare recipients directly to available jobs may create stronger 
results. A recent evaluation of California’s comprehensive welfare-to-work program, Greater 
Avenues for Independence, suggests the direct link for program participants to job creation may 
have been an important reason the community of Riverside achieved greater success than other 
communities. The program’s message about employment and the active use of job development 
to establish a close link to private-sector employers may have enhanced the benefits of other 
program components, such as job search, basic education, and vocational education and training, 
in Riverside (Riccio, Friedlander, and Freedman, 1994). 
Policy Implications 
State agencies now are attempting to link their training programs directly to real jobs in order to 
create work opportunities for the unemployed and people on welfare. The Department of Labor 
is coordinating its services with the state’s economic development programs to provide "one-stop 
shopping" for companies. It also will give preference, when using the Governor’s Training 
Initiative funds, to companies that train the economically disadvantaged, including welfare 
recipients. The Department of Health and Human 
Services has created a new job development position in southern Maine to contact businesses, 
sell the department’s training services, and place ASPIRE participants in jobs. 
These are important directions. State agencies could go further, as CEI’s Employment and 
Training Agreement suggests, and target a percentage of jobs to low-income and welfare 
recipients as part of the quid pro quo of receiving financing from state economic development 
agencies and other state-financed local and regional financing programs. 
However, even if state policy were to initiate employment agreements modeled after CEI, 
questions would remain about how well such agreements can be institutionalized on a larger 
scale. Effective targeting and brokering of jobs on a statewide basis require both micro and 
macro factors: an ability to work with companies and pull together various resources; and an 
adequate supply of quality jobs for the targeted population. 
CEI has learned several lessons from its experience in targeted development that inform policy 
and practice:  
• Targeted development requires staff who understand company needs. 
Staff needs to interpret whether poor company performance on targeting goals reflects a lack of 
will or external economic forces. Good working relationships are based on trust, not sanctions. 
At the same time, targeting will not happen without active monitoring of company agreements.  
• Targeted development incurs additional upfront costs compared to traditional approaches 
to development. 
Initial costs include training, support, and brokering services for targeted populations. The 
brokering costs, such as in CEI’s Employment and Training Agreement model, are a small 
portion of the total costs but an important piece that makes targeting effective.  
• The greater the desired impact from targeting, the more time and resources are required 
to gather information on companies, services, clients, and results. 
The optimal program requires more research focused on the front-end costs of targeted 
development as well as the long-term quantifiable and intangible impacts for welfare recipients, 
their families, and the regional economy. 
In the best scenarios, AFDC recipients are employed in jobs that pay liveable wages and 
eventually become self-sufficient. The second-best outcome is that targeted development offers 
them an opportunity for training, developing self-esteem and self-confidence, and gaining work 
experience, while reducing net welfare expenditures. Although they may not be totally self-
sufficient in the short run, the work experience creates higher incomes and a future of moving 
towards self-sufficiency.  
• Targeted development policies depend on the overall number of quality jobs created in 
the state economy. 
The shortage of quality jobs within reach of welfare recipients, even with customized education 
and training, is a limiting factor. Economic development policies must continue to address how 
more, better-paying jobs can be created, not only by targeting specific high-paying sectors, but 
also by targeting firms that offer employees a financial stake in their firms. Companies that 
create quality jobs should have priority in state economic development policy. 
Carla Dickstein is senior development officer for research and 
policy development at Coastal Enterprises Inc. (CEI) in 
Wiscasset. Prior to coming to CEI, she was on the faculty at 
the Regional Research Institute at West Virginia University. 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes: 
1 Kossy (1996) argues that during the last decade, economic development practice moved away 
from equity and poverty concerns because of the decline in federal funding and the increased 
reliance on state and local funding. Roundy’s 1996 paper that attempts to quantify the various 
economic development funding streams in Maine suggests general funding far outweighs 
targeted funds, although the paper does not specifically quantify targeted programs. Furthermore, 
Roundy acknowledges his figures do not include the millions of dollars of investments made in 
economic development infrastructure, such as transportation. 
2 Examples include that the average per capita personal income in the poorest counties to achieve 
75 percent of the average per capita income of wealthiest counties by 2005, or the 10-year 
growth rate in income for the poorest one-fifth of Maine families should exceed the 10-year 
growth rate in income for the wealthiest one-fifth of families. (See Maine Development 
Foundation, 1996). 
3 Examples include the Employment Tax Increment Financing program, which requires 
companies receiving tax credits to create at least 15 jobs with health benefits, pensions, and 
wages above the per capita income for the labor market area, and the Governor’s Training 
Initiative that authorizes the Commissioner of Labor to develop standards by rule to encourage 
high-quality job creation and expansion. 
4 Blom and Garber’s 1996 research on the Maine income gap found that "The average pay in a 
Maine household making less than $30,000 a year--roughly half the population--declined from 
1989 to 1994." According to the Economic Policy Institute (1996), "Wages have fallen since the 
1980s among men, younger workers, and the 75 percent of the workforce without a four-year 
college degree. . . . From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, even high-wage, white-collar and 
college-educated men saw their wages fall or stagnate." 
5 The liveable wage is based on Stephanie Seguino’s article (1995a) that estimates three basic-
need budgets for a single parent with two children; two children under 6; one child under 6; and 
two children over 6. An hourly rate of $11.55 represents the average. Seguino’s hourly estimates 
include expenditures for health care. 
6 Blom (April 28, 1996) cites Edward Wolff, a New York University economist, who says, "The 
run-up of stock prices, particularly in the 1990s, is through rising profitability of businesses." 
That is done to a large extent by keeping wages low. 
7 See the evaluation of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit program (U.S. Department of Labor, 1994); 
the evaluation of the job-training programs by the Manpower Research Development 
Corporation (Auspos and Long, 1988; Freedman and Cabe, 1988). 
8 A controlled experiment of AFDC recipients’ job-search activities in Dayton, Ohio in the early 
1980s showed that those offering cash vouchers and tax-credit vouchers actually had a poorer job 
placement record than those who did not identify themselves as AFDC recipients. (Burtless, 
1985). 
9 Conversation with Timothy Bartik at the Upjohn Institute, July 1995. 
10 CEI’s Small Business Finance and Employment Training Project begun in 1984 was a 
demonstration of the targeted development model that was completed successfully. See the 
evaluation by McDonald (1986) at the Center for Research and Advanced Study at the 
University of Southern Maine. 
11 CEI’s experience confirms Bartik’s (1993) assumptions that customized business assistance 
programs and pre-screening of low-income applicants can overcome the stigma problem. 
12 Seguino (1995a) derived the budget from scenarios for a single-parent, three-person family in 
Maine in 1993 based on the average of a single parent with two children under 6, a single parent 
with one child under 6 and one older, and a single parent with two children over 6. 
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